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I am very grateful to Steve Parish for his thoughtful review, which made me recall 
and rethink what I was trying to do in writing my book without making me feel bad about 
what I actually wrote.  In this short and inadequate response I will try to clarify why I left 
some very important issues aside and fill in a few of the gaps.   
First, since one central issue Parish raises is the role of history in the construction 
of authenticity, perhaps I should begin with the history of the book under review. It 
originated in a class I taught in which I spent much of my time outlining the 
philosophical and literary trajectory of authenticity from the 17th century, when it first 
appeared in the West. For various reasons, I left almost all of this out of the book, and it 
may answer some questions if I recapitulate that intellectual background briefly here.   
As Lionel Trilling tells us, the first exemplar of authenticity was Alceste, the self-
righteous hero of Molière’s The Misanthrope, who asserted that “a man should be a man, 
and let his speech at every turn reveal his heart to each; his own true self should speak; 
our sentiments should never hide beneath vain compliments"  (Molière  1968:69).  
Molière portrayed Alceste as a ridiculous figure: a self-righteous narcissist whose 
unrealistic demands lead him to isolation and disaster. A far more ambiguous exemplar of 
authenticity appeared a generation later, in Denis Diderot’s subversive masterpiece 
Rameau’s Nephew (1956), which was suppressed until Goethe’s translation.   Diderot 
imagined his hero as a rogue and fool who was nonetheless could see through the 
artifices of the world and act without deceiving himself about his own base and self-
serving motives.  
In The Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel depicted Rameau’s nephew as the first of a 
new type of radically authentic individuals who no longer identify with society and 
instead embrace fragmentation and marginalization, “rending and tearing everything” and 
pouring contemptuous scorn on the lifeless and fraudulent world of the bourgeoisie. 
Shameless, perverted, and “conscious of its own distraught and torn condition” (Hegel 
1967: 542, 546). Rameau’s nephew prefigured Dostoevsky’s underground man, Sartre’s 
Saint Genet, and the other corrosively obscene, marginal, criminal and deviant anti-
heroes who are so characteristic of the modern literature of authenticity.   
But Hegel’s picture was one-sided. Diderot also imagined Rameau’s nephew as 
an artist and visionary. These aspects of his character were the inspiration for J.W. 
Goethe’s famous portrayal of the prototypical romantic, young Werther, who sought 
authentic feeling through communing with his own heart, “which is my only pride, and 
the fountainhead of all - all strength, happiness and misery.  Anyone can know what I 
know.  My heart alone is my own" (Goethe 1990: 97). In Goethe’s cautionary tale, 
Werther’s inability to realize his ideal love eventually drives him to despair and suicide.  
For Hegel, Werther exemplified a failed type of solipsistic consciousness, one incapable 
of differentiating its own desires for felt authenticity from the realities of the world, and 
so susceptible to the “frenzy of self-conceit”  (Hegel 1967: 390-400). 
The character of Werther was also deeply indebted to the work of Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, who had heralded a new ideal of being true to oneself when he claimed moral 
credit for exposing his worst defects in his scandalous Confessions (1954). For Rousseau, 
as for his Calvinist forefathers, so long as a person heeds the prompting of his or her 
inner being, the judgments of others count for nothing.  Rousseau was the first 
philosopher to view authenticity in a completely positive light, and the first to see modern 
humanity as fundamentally inauthentic, made false to itself by pride and vanity.  For him, 
in the modern world only primitives, peasants, and children were capable of living 
without hypocrisy, although a few spiritually gifted people, such as himself, could 
commune with their true inner selves when lost in mystical states of reverie.  
More than a century later, Rousseau’s contempt for the world was matched and 
even exceeded by Nietzsche’s disgust at the “last men” who have become mere “strolling 
spectators” animated by feeble nostalgia for the strong passions of a lost past. To 
transcend the soulless present, the Nietzschean seeker had to tear away the veils of 
convention, morality, and faith.  “Let him follow his conscience, which calls out to him: 
'Be yourself! What you're doing, supposing, desiring now - that's not you at all’” 
(Nietzsche 1990: 163).  Only when human beings actually experience a subjective 
sensation of vital empowerment can they realize themselves as authentic and self-
actualized agents. 
Nietzsche’s greatest disciple and critic, Martin Heidegger, also believed that in 
the modern world  “everyone is the other, and no one is himself…. The Self of everyday 
Dasein (being) is the they-self which we distinguish from the authentic self – that is, from 
the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way”’ (Heidegger 1962: 165, 167). 
According to Heidegger, to achieve authenticity one had to rigorously clear away the 
external and internal obstacles, temptations and delusions which bar the way to genuine 
spiritual self-realization. This effort was concretely expressed in his repudiation of the 
hustle and variety of cosmopolitan urban life, and by the cultivation of folk crafts, a plain 
unadorned language, and a simple, self-sufficient rural lifestyle.  Action was valued over 
discourse and reflection, which only obscured the purity of authentic Dasein.  1 
 Heidegger’s French disciple, Sartre, took a different tack.  As he described in 
Being and Nothingness (1966), the inevitable chasm between the self as an object (in-
itself) and as a transcendence of being (for-itself) means humans exist in an unbearable 
“metastable” state between self-objectification and freedom without limit or content.  In 
response to this predicament, the psyche tries to convince itself of its own solidity, and so 
feebly accepts the performance of social roles as real, while still knowing they are mere 
facades. To escape from this existential dilemma, we all attempt to become the parts we 
play, but an awareness of falsity and a longing for authenticity remains, to be partially 
assuaged only when we recognize our own responsibility for our fates in a meaningless 
universe. Sartre thus presents another almost Calvinist vision in which the anguished 
consciousness is caught in the paradox of being what it is not and not being what it is, 
enmeshed in a world where there is no possible meaning or direction.  
These are a few of the major examples of the way authenticity has been 
conceptualized by Western thinkers whose attitude toward authenticity has ranged from 
ridicule of the posturing of the self-righteous seeker to the apotheosis of the anti-social 
outlaw or romantic dreamer, to resignation at the impossibility of ever becoming 
authentic at all, while authenticity itself has been imagined as an experience of emotional 
connection with an inner truth, a quest for pure love, or, in Sartre’s case, acceptance of 
suffering.  The most positive accounts of authenticity are characteristically American, 
following Emerson’s great essay “Self Reliance” in which he grandly asserts: “No law 
can be sacred to me but that of my nature. Good and bad are but names very readily 
transferable to that or this; the only right is what is after my constitution; the only wrong 
what is against it” (Emerson 1950: 148).  
For various reasons, the only one of these thinkers I retained in my final text was 
Rousseau, whom I presented as the exemplar for all later manifestations of authenticity.  
As I hope this short outline has made clear, this was a simplification.  But I tried to make 
up for the lack of philosophical background by outlining some of the major structural and 
cultural prerequisites necessary for the appearance and expansion of authenticity.  As 
Parish points out, I did indeed posit that a central condition for the rise of authenticity 
was social and spatial mobility, combined with the heightened anonymity of an 
increasingly industrialized and urbanized world.  Living among strangers makes it 
possible and likely for people to think about discovering “who they really are.”  But this 
was not the only requirement, and probably not even the weightiest.  For example, the 
self-interrogating and individualistic creed of Protestantism (which itself has a highly 
complex origin) made believers skeptical about the moral value of social roles, and led 
some of them to seek an irrefutable inner experience of spiritual enlightenment.  This was 
a crucial psychic move toward authenticity.    
As Parish also rightly notes, unexpected support for the pursuit of an authentic 
reality came from the Cartesian approach to science, which preached detachment from 
the world, critical thought, and an introspective search for ultimate truth.  But Descartes’ 
was not alone in his disconnection.  The worldview of Capitalism, associated intimately 
with both Protestantism and scientific reason, also had a major part to play in the 
evolution of authenticity.  In a fluid marketplace, the former cosmic order of work and 
locality no longer defined the self.  Subservience and role-playing became shameful, and 
newly rootless individuals nostalgically began to seek truth not in ritual, but in the 
expressive emotional intimacy of family life.  This was a major source for the association 
between authenticity and feeling.  The value of authenticity also ascended on the rising 
tide of individuality, democracy, and equality in the 17th and 18th centuries, which, 
along with capitalism, mobility, the public/private split, Protestant faith, and a scientific 
worldview, presumed the existence of a universal moral self, hidden beneath the 
masquerade of social roles.  Finding and revealing this true self became the holy grail of 
modernity. 
So far, I have tried to describe the cultural/historical context conducive to the 
appearance of authenticity as a value, and I have shown, very sketchily, how it was 
evoked over time, arguing (banally) that a number of intersecting structures and values 
played a part, thereby deflecting (if not answering) Parish’s accusation that I favored 
Rousseau over Descartes as the major exemplar of authenticity.  But I have managed to 
avoid Parish’s main and most substantial query, which is: How can we compare the 
situation of “us moderns” to the subjective realities of other cultures, where people also 
may well be “among strangers” and may well also suffer feelings of self-estrangement 
and alienation. In this query, he seems to be saying (and if he is, I agree) that the human 
condition is necessarily one of existential “fear and trembling.”  As Hank Williams said: 
“No one gets out of this life alive.”  Yet the search for authenticity is far from universal; 
rather it is particularly modern, and possibly particularly Western.  
The reason, he suggests, is that in non-Western societies (at least in some of 
them), existential disarray can be converted into a comforting “indexical” ritual 
performance that intimately involves the self, establishing an embodied and immediate 
emotional relationship with a meaningful and numinous cosmos.  By arousing strong 
feelings of participation, the threat of anomie is offset – the self is integrated within a 
larger universe, and is not just another symbol to be manipulated for instrumental reasons 
– as is the case in the modern world.  If I understand this argument aright, I accept it 
entirely, and regret I did not explore this avenue further.  In fact, when I originally 
proposed the book I intended to present a number of case studies showing how alternative 
cultural modes of communion operated, with specific reference to the manner in which 
emotions were conceived, expressed and utilized. For example, according to the Islamic 
notion of adab   “all behavior has to be channeled into revealed and correct forms that 
eliminate idiosyncratic irrational expressions of feeling.”  The ideal result is “an alert, 
conscious, voluntary, anti-instinctual control of emotion and impulse and the disciplining 
of natural drives into a patterned way of life” (Lapidus 1984:57).   Through this 
discipline, it was (and still is) believed that the devotee could reach a state of inner being 
that approaches the ultimate.  If I had space here, I could describe other, very different, 
conscious modes of channeling and intensifying the emotions in order to reach the state 
of felt immediacy that our own pursuit of authenticity also strives for, however weakly.  
But those stories will have to be told at another time. 
To conclude, the quest for the immediate felt experience that we call authenticity 
began on the rubble of reliable, sacralized institutional/ritual frameworks that once 
offered supplicants both order and transcendence.  In the absence of such frameworks, 
and subject to the instrumental, impersonal, isolating, and pitiless demands of modernity, 
individuals in the West (and now elsewhere too) have struggled to find a satisfying and 
convincing way to define and experience themselves. When the indexical experience of 
ritual is no longer possible, authenticity is one way to fill the gap. 
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Notes 
1 It was the ultimately tragic Nazi willingness to act forcefully, and seek a more 
primordial and emotional truth in mystical volk consciousness that convinced Heidegger 
– at least for a short time - of their potential to rejuvenate the German soul.  
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